Religion and Rationality—A Critical Inquiry

Religion and Rationality—A Critical Inquiry
Religion and Rationality—A Critical Inquiry


Introduction: Beyond the Caricature of Conflict

The relationship between religion and rationality is arguably one of the most enduring and consequential conversations in human history. In the popular imagination, this relationship is often framed as a simplistic, zero-sum conflict: the ethereal glow of faith pitted against the cold, hard light of reason. This is the narrative of an irreconcilable war, with Galileo versus the Inquisition as its poster child and the modern "New Atheist" movement as its contemporary vanguard. For postgraduate scholars, however, this caricature is a wholly inadequate starting point. Our task is to dismantle this popular narrative and engage with the far more intricate, context-dependent, and philosophically profound reality of their interaction.

This inquiry is not merely an abstract academic exercise. It touches upon the very foundations of knowledge (epistemology), the nature of reality (ontology), and the basis of our moral lives (ethics). It forces us to ask fundamental questions: What constitutes a "good" reason for belief? Is rationality a universal, ahistorical tool, or is it itself a culturally and historically shaped concept? Can meaning and morality exist in a "disenchanted" world, stripped of religious narratives?

To navigate this complex terrain, we will move beyond simplistic binaries. We will treat both "religion" and "rationality" not as monolithic entities but as diverse and internally contested categories. Our journey will be structured around several key themes:

  1. Conceptual Deconstruction: We will begin by critically examining our core terms, moving beyond dictionary definitions to understand how scholars in the humanities and social sciences have conceptualised them.
  2. Historical Contingency: We will trace the historical trajectory of their relationship, demonstrating that the now-dominant "conflict" model is a relatively recent product of specific Western intellectual and political developments, namely the Enlightenment.
  3. Philosophical Frameworks: We will delve into the major philosophical arguments concerning the rationality of religious belief, from classical evidentialism to more nuanced contemporary approaches like Reformed Epistemology and Wittgensteinian analysis.
  4. Critical Perspectives: We will engage with the "masters of suspicion"—Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud—and the sociological titans, Durkheim and Weber, who sought to explain religion from the outside as a human, social, and psychological phenomenon.
  5. Models of Interaction: We will analyse the four primary models—Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration—that scholars use to map the relationship, particularly in the context of science.
  6. Contemporary Relevance: We will conclude by exploring the dialogue's evolution in our current "post-secular," globalised world, touching upon the challenges and opportunities presented by postmodernism, the cognitive science of religion, and ongoing ethical debates.

This comprehensive approach will equip you not to find a single, definitive answer, but to appreciate the depth of the questions and to develop the critical tools necessary to analyse one of the central dramas of human thought.

Deconstructing the Core Concepts: What Are We Really Talking About?

Any serious inquiry must begin with conceptual clarity. Both "religion" and "rationality" are notoriously difficult to define, and our understanding of them profoundly shapes the questions we ask.

Defining "Religion": Beyond Belief

A simplistic definition of religion as "belief in God" is entirely insufficient. It is overtly Judeo-Christian-centric and excludes non-theistic traditions like certain schools of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Scholars have therefore proposed more sophisticated approaches.

  • Substantive vs. Functional Definitions: A substantive definition focuses on the content or "what" of religion—for example, a belief in supernatural beings or a transcendent reality. A classic example is E.B. Tylor's "belief in Spiritual Beings." The weakness of this approach is its potential for being too narrow. In contrast, a functional definition focuses on the purpose or "what religion does" for individuals and societies. For example, the sociologist Milton Yinger defined religion as "a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with the ultimate problems of human life." The weakness here is the risk of being too broad—could a political ideology like Marxism or even intense devotion to a football club functionally count as a religion?
  • Key Scholarly Formulations:
    • Émile Durkheim: In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim offered a sociological definition: "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them." The key here is the binary of the sacred (the special, powerful, and set-apart) and the profane (the ordinary, everyday). For Durkheim, religion is fundamentally a social phenomenon.
    • Paul Tillich: The theologian defined religion as that which concerns one's "ultimate concern." Whatever an individual takes to be the ultimate ground of their being and meaning—be it God, the nation, success, or truth—functions as their religion. This is a powerful, inclusive functional definition.
    • Clifford Geertz: The anthropologist provided an influential definition focusing on culture: "a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." Here, religion is a cultural system that provides meaning and makes the world intelligible.

For our purposes, we will understand religion as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon encompassing beliefs, practices, rituals, ethical frameworks, and communal identities, all oriented around a conception of the sacred or ultimate reality.

Defining "Rationality": Not a Monolith

Similarly, "rationality" is not a single, simple thing. The Enlightenment promoted a specific vision of rationality as universal, abstract, and grounded in a priori logic and empirical evidence. However, philosophers and sociologists have shown that there are different types and conceptions of rationality.

  • Aristotelian Distinctions: Aristotle distinguished between theoretical reason (theoria), which seeks knowledge for its own sake (e.g., metaphysics, mathematics), and practical reason (phronesis), which is concerned with acting wisely in particular situations. This reminds us that rationality is not just about abstract proofs but also about navigating the world ethically and effectively.
  • Weber's Typology: Max Weber, in his analysis of social action, identified four types of rationality:
    1. Instrumental Rationality (Zweckrationalität): This is the most common understanding of rationality in the modern world. It involves calculating the most efficient means to achieve a specific end, without reflecting on the value of the end itself.
    2. Value-Rationality (Wertrationalität): This involves action undertaken because it is intrinsically valuable (e.g., ethical, aesthetic, or religious), regardless of its practical success. An act of martyrdom could be seen as highly value-rational but instrumentally irrational.
    3. Affectual Rationality: Action driven by emotions.
    4. Traditional Rationality: Action guided by custom and habit. Weber's key insight was that modern Western society was characterised by the increasing dominance of instrumental rationality, a process he called "rationalisation."
  • Scientific Rationality: In the 20th century, philosophers of science like Karl Popper defined scientific rationality through the principle of falsification. A theory is scientific not if it can be proven true, but if it is, in principle, capable of being proven false. This sets a very high bar for what counts as a rational, scientific claim—a bar that most religious claims, which are typically non-falsifiable, cannot meet.
  • Communicative Rationality: Jürgen Habermas critiqued the dominance of instrumental rationality. He proposed the concept of communicative rationality, which is the reason we use when we engage in open, uncoerced dialogue to reach a mutual understanding. It is a social and intersubjective form of reason, rather than the isolated reason of a Cartesian thinker.

This pluralistic understanding is crucial. When we ask, "Is religion rational?" we must immediately follow up with, "By what definition of rationality?" Is it the narrow, instrumental, and falsifiable rationality of modern science, or a broader conception that includes moral, existential, and communicative dimensions?

A Historical Trajectory: From Synthesis to Schism

The notion of an eternal war between religion and rationality is a myth. A historical survey reveals a long and complex story of synthesis, dialogue, and debate, followed by a relatively recent and culturally specific "rupture."

The Pre-Modern Synthesis (c. 400 BCE – 1600 CE)

In the ancient and medieval worlds, philosophy (the primary vehicle of rationality) was often seen as the "handmaiden of theology" (ancilla theologiae), a tool to elucidate, defend, and deepen religious understanding.

  • The Greek Foundations: The groundwork was laid in ancient Greece. Plato's theory of Forms proposed that the true reality was an eternal, unchanging world of ideas (the intelligible realm), accessible only through reason, of which our physical world is but a pale imitation. This created a powerful intellectual framework where the pursuit of truth through reason was inherently a spiritual and transcendent quest. Aristotle, while more focused on the empirical world, developed a rigorous system of logic and metaphysics that culminated in the concept of the Unmoved Mover—a self-thinking thought that is the ultimate cause of all motion in the universe. This was a purely philosophical deduction of a God-like principle. Later, Neoplatonism, particularly through Plotinus, synthesised these ideas into a mystical metaphysics that profoundly influenced the Abrahamic faiths.
  • The Islamic Golden Age: Between the 8th and 13th centuries, the Islamic world was the global centre of intellectual life. The Mu'tazila school of theology championed the use of reason (aql) to interpret the Qur'an, arguing that reason and revelation could not contradict each other. Philosophers known as the falasifa engaged in a monumental project to synthesise Greek philosophy with Islamic doctrine.
    • Ibn Sina (Avicenna) created a vast philosophical system that integrated Aristotelian logic and metaphysics with Islamic concepts, proving enormously influential in both the Islamic world and Europe.
    • Ibn Rushd (Averroes), known in the West as "The Commentator," wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle. He argued for a "double truth" theory, suggesting that philosophy and religion were two different paths to the same truth, one for the educated elite (philosophy) and one for the masses (religion). His work was a direct catalyst for the revival of Aristotle in Christian Europe.
    • This rationalist tradition was famously challenged by Al-Ghazali in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, where he used philosophical tools to critique the philosophers' claims on issues like the eternity of the world and bodily resurrection. This, in turn, provoked Ibn Rushd's defence in The Incoherence of the Incoherence, a high point of philosophical debate.
  • Christian Scholasticism: The rediscovery of Aristotle in Europe (largely through translations from Arabic) spurred the intellectual movement of Scholasticism. The goal was fides quaerens intellectum—"faith seeking understanding." The method involved rigorous logical analysis, dialectical reasoning, and systematic argumentation.
    • Anselm of Canterbury famously formulated the ontological argument for God's existence, a purely a priori argument that attempts to prove God exists from the very definition of God.
    • Thomas Aquinas stands as the pinnacle of this tradition. In his Summa Theologica, he masterfully synthesised Aristotelian philosophy with Christian doctrine. He distinguished between truths knowable by natural reason (e.g., the existence of God, basic moral laws) and truths that could only be known through divine revelation (e.g., the Trinity, the Incarnation). His "Five Ways" are classic examples of natural theology, using empirical observations about motion, causality, and contingency to reason towards the existence of a First Cause, or God.
  • Indian Philosophical Traditions: In India, several of the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy (darśanas) were deeply rationalistic. The Nyāya school, in particular, was dedicated to logic and epistemology. They developed a sophisticated system for argumentation and identified four valid means of knowledge (pramanas). They used this logical apparatus to construct elaborate arguments for the existence of Ishvara (a personal God) as the efficient cause of the universe.

In all these diverse pre-modern contexts, reason was not seen as the enemy of faith, but as a God-given faculty for exploring the divinely created order of the cosmos and the inner logic of revelation itself.

The Enlightenment Rupture (c. 1650 – 1800 CE)

The Enlightenment marks a profound shift in the Western intellectual landscape. Fueled by the scientific revolution and weary of the sectarian violence of the Wars of Religion, thinkers sought a new, universal foundation for knowledge and social order based on autonomous human reason alone.

  • The Turn to the Subject: René Descartes's famous declaration, "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"), relocated the foundation of certainty from God or tradition to the individual, rational self. This marked the beginning of modern philosophy.
  • The Rise of Empiricism: British empiricists like John Locke and David Hume argued that all knowledge originates in sense experience. Hume, in particular, mounted devastating critiques of core religious beliefs. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he argued that it is never rational to believe in a miracle, as the evidence for the regular laws of nature will always outweigh the testimony for a miraculous violation of them. He also dismantled the teleological argument (the argument from design), pointing out that the analogy between the universe and a human-made machine is weak and that a chaotic, un-designed process could also result in an ordered world.
  • Immanuel Kant's Copernican Revolution: Kant represents a crucial turning point. Alarmed by Hume's scepticism, he sought to establish a secure foundation for both science and morality. He argued that reason alone could not prove metaphysical claims about God, the soul, or the ultimate nature of reality (the "noumenal" world). Such topics were beyond the limits of theoretical reason, which could only apply to the world of experience (the "phenomenal" world).
    • However, in his Critique of Practical Reason and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant argued that belief in God was a necessary "postulate" of moral reason. For morality to be coherent, we must assume the existence of God, freedom, and immortality to ensure that virtue will ultimately be rewarded with happiness. For Kant, religion is thus rationalised and ethicized; its value lies not in explaining the world, but in supporting the moral life.

The Enlightenment, therefore, did not necessarily destroy religion, but it profoundly relocated it. It was privatised, separated from public reason and science, and its claims were subordinated to the tribunal of autonomous human reason. The modern schism between "faith" and "reason" was now firmly in place.

Core Philosophical Debates: The Justification of Religious Belief

Following the Enlightenment, the central question became one of justification: Can religious belief be considered rationally permissible, or even required? A number of distinct positions have emerged.

Evidentialism: The Demand for Proof

Evidentialism is the philosophical position most aligned with the Enlightenment spirit. Its thesis is simple and powerful, articulated forcefully by the 19th-century mathematician W.K. Clifford: "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

  • The Argument: For the evidentialist, belief is a matter of epistemic responsibility. To believe without sufficient evidence is a moral and intellectual failure. Religious beliefs—in God, miracles, and an afterlife—are empirical claims about the way the world is. As such, they require empirical evidence or logical proof.
  • Atheist Arguments: Many contemporary atheist thinkers operate from an evidentialist framework. They argue that:
    1. There is a lack of positive evidence for God's existence. The classical arguments (ontological, cosmological, teleological) have been subject to powerful philosophical critiques since Hume and Kant.
    2. There is strong negative evidence against God's existence, most notably the Problem of Evil. The existence of gratuitous suffering in the world seems logically incompatible with the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good being. The Argument from Divine Hiddenness similarly asks why a loving God would remain so hidden from so many people.
  • The Challenge: The evidentialist challenge forces the believer to either provide the required evidence (a project known as natural theology) or to argue that the evidentialist demand itself is misplaced when it comes to religious faith.

Fideism: The Leap of Faith

Fideism, in its most extreme form, asserts that faith is independent of, or even antagonistic to, reason. The most sophisticated proponent of a fideistic position is the 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard.

  • Kierkegaard's Position: For Kierkegaard, faith is not the acceptance of a set of doctrines; it is a passionate, subjective commitment in the face of objective uncertainty. Reason and evidence can only take us so far, leading us to probabilities and approximations. But religious faith requires an infinite, passionate commitment. To bridge this gap requires a "leap of faith."
  • The Knight of Faith: In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard uses the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac to illustrate his point. God commands Abraham to do something that is ethically monstrous and rationally absurd: sacrifice his beloved son. From the perspective of universal ethics and reason, Abraham is a murderer. But from the perspective of faith, he is the "knight of faith" who makes a "teleological suspension of the ethical," trusting in his personal relationship with the absolute (God) over universal rational principles. Faith, for Kierkegaard, is not against reason, but beyond its limits. It operates in a different sphere.

Reformed Epistemology: Belief Without Evidence

A highly influential contemporary response to evidentialism comes from a group of philosophers led by Alvin Plantinga. They argue that belief in God can be perfectly rational even without any evidence or argument.

  • Properly Basic Beliefs: Plantinga argues that we all accept many beliefs without evidence. These are called "properly basic beliefs." For example, you believe that the past is real, that other people have minds, and that the external world exists. You don't have a logical proof for these things; you just find yourself believing them under certain conditions. They are the foundation upon which your other beliefs are built.
  • The Aquinas/Calvin Model: Plantinga proposes that belief in God is also properly basic. Drawing on John Calvin's notion of a sensus divinitatis (a sense of the divine), he argues that humans are created with a natural, innate cognitive faculty that, when functioning properly in the right environment (e.g., when one beholds a starry night or a moral truth), produces the belief in God.
  • Warrant and Proper Function: For Plantinga, a belief is warranted (a condition for knowledge) if it is produced by a cognitive faculty that is functioning properly in the environment for which it was designed. If the sensus divinitatis exists and is functioning properly, then the belief in God it produces is warranted and rational, regardless of whether the believer can offer any arguments for it. This cleverly shifts the debate from a focus on evidence to a focus on the proper function of our cognitive faculties.

Wittgensteinian Fideism: Religion as a Language Game

A different approach, inspired by the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, suggests that the entire debate is based on a conceptual confusion.

  • Language Games and Forms of Life: Wittgenstein argued that language gets its meaning from its use within a particular context, which he called a "language game." Science is one language game, with its own rules for what counts as evidence, proof, and a meaningful statement. Religion is another, distinct language game, embedded in a "form of life" (a whole system of practices, rituals, and ways of being).
  • A Category Mistake: From this perspective, championed by philosophers like D.Z. Phillips, religious utterances like "God exists" are not empirical hypotheses about a being in the universe, comparable to "Black holes exist." To treat them as such, and to demand scientific evidence for them, is to make a category mistake. It is like asking for the square root of a symphony. The meaning of "God exists" is found within the religious form of life—in prayer, worship, and moral conduct. Therefore, asking if religious belief is "rational" by scientific or external standards is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of religious language.

Analysing Religion from the Outside: The Hermeneutics of Suspicion

While philosophers debated the internal justification of belief, another powerful intellectual tradition emerged that sought to explain religion itself as a product of non-religious forces. This is the "hermeneutics of suspicion," which aims to unmask the hidden, often unflattering, origins of religious phenomena.

The Masters of Suspicion

The term, coined by philosopher Paul Ricoeur, refers to the three great demystifiers of the 19th century:

  • Karl Marx (Economic Suspicion): For Marx, religion is part of the "superstructure" of society, which is determined by the economic "base" (the means and relations of production). In a capitalist society, religion functions as an ideology. It is "the opium of the people," a painkiller that dulls the suffering of the oppressed proletariat by promising them a deferred reward in the afterlife (pie in the sky when you die). It also legitimises the power of the ruling class by presenting the existing social order as natural and divinely ordained ("the rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate"). Religion, for Marx, is a form of false consciousness that must be overcome for the revolution to occur.
  • Friedrich Nietzsche (Moral Suspicion): Nietzsche offered a genealogical critique of religious morality. In On the Genealogy of Morals, he argued that Judeo-Christian morality was a "slave morality," born out of the resentment (ressentiment) of the weak and oppressed against their powerful masters. It inverted the "master morality" of the ancient world by rebranding weakness as "goodness" (e.g., meekness, humility, pity) and strength as "evil." For Nietzsche, the "death of God" was a momentous cultural event that exposed the hollowness of these values and created a crisis of meaning (nihilism). The challenge for humanity was for the Übermensch (Overman) to emerge and create new values beyond the old categories of good and evil.
  • Sigmund Freud (Psychological Suspicion): Freud saw religion as a collective neurosis, a projection of infantile psychological needs onto the cosmos. In The Future of an Illusion, he argued that the powerful, unpredictable forces of nature and the internal frustrations of civilisation leave humans feeling helpless and childlike. In response, we project the image of an all-powerful father figure onto the universe—God—who can protect us, give our lives meaning, and reward us for our suffering. Religious rituals are like obsessional neuroses, and religious doctrines are illusions, believed not because of evidence, but because they fulfil our deepest wishes.

The Sociological Perspective

Sociology, as a discipline, was born out of an attempt to rationally understand the social world, including the powerful force of religion.

  • Émile Durkheim (Religion as Social Glue): Durkheim argued that the primary function of religion is to generate social solidarity. By worshipping sacred objects (totems) and engaging in collective rituals, a society is, in effect, worshipping itself and reaffirming its own collective identity. The experience of being in a crowd during an intense ritual can generate a powerful feeling of shared emotion and transcendence, which Durkheim called "collective effervescence." For Durkheim, God is a symbol for society itself.
  • Max Weber (Rationalisation and Disenchantment): Weber's work is central to understanding the relationship between religion and rationality in the modern world. He argued that a key feature of Western history was a process of rationalisation—the increasing dominance of calculation, efficiency, and instrumental reason in all spheres of life, from bureaucracy to capitalism. This process leads to the "disenchantment of the world" (Entzauberung), where magical, mystical, and spiritual explanations are replaced by scientific and technical ones.
    • In his most famous work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber argued that a peculiar form of religious value-rationality paradoxically helped create the conditions for modern instrumental rationality. The Calvinist doctrines of predestination and worldly asceticism created intense anxiety among believers, who looked for signs of their salvation. They found this sign in hard work, disciplined living, and economic success, which they interpreted as a sign of God's favour. This religious ethic, Weber argued, had an "elective affinity" with the rational, systematic pursuit of profit that defines the "spirit of capitalism."

Mapping the Relationship: Four Models of Interaction

Especially within the dialogue between science and religion, scholars have found it useful to think in terms of four primary models of interaction, a typology most famously developed by Ian Barbour.

  1. Conflict: This is the warfare model, which sees religion and science as locked in an eternal battle over truth. Science is based on evidence and reason, while religion is based on dogma and superstition. One must win, and the other must lose. This view, while popular, is seen by most historians as an oversimplification of a much more complex history.
  2. Independence: This model argues that religion and science are entirely separate and autonomous domains of inquiry. They ask different questions, use different methods, and speak different languages. Stephen Jay Gould famously called this model "Non-Overlapping Magisteria" (NOMA). Science's magisterium is the empirical realm (what the universe is made of and how it works); religion's magisterium is the realm of ultimate meaning and moral value. They cannot conflict because they are not talking about the same things.
  3. Dialogue: This model accepts the independence of the two domains but insists that they can and should engage in conversation. They can learn from each other. Science can raise questions that have theological implications (e.g., in cosmology or neuroscience), and religion can offer ethical frameworks and perspectives on the meaning and purpose of scientific inquiry. Thinkers like the physicist-theologian John Polkinghorne are prominent advocates of this approach.
  4. Integration: This is the most ambitious model, seeking a true synthesis of scientific and religious insights. It comes in two main forms:
    • Natural Theology: As seen with Aquinas, this approach uses the findings of science and the methods of reason to argue for the existence and nature of God.
    • Theology of Nature: This approach takes the established truths of science as a starting point and reformulates religious doctrines to be in harmony with them. Process theology, inspired by the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, is a key example. It conceives of God not as a static, omnipotent monarch outside of time, but as a being who is intrinsically involved in the cosmic process of evolution, luring the world towards greater complexity and harmony.

Conclusion: The Dialogue in a Post-Secular World

The conversation between religion and rationality is far from over. In the 21st century, it continues to evolve in fascinating and unexpected ways.

  • The Postmodern Critique: Postmodern thinkers like Jean-François Lyotard have challenged the Enlightenment's faith in Reason itself. They have declared an "incredulity toward metanarratives"—a suspicion of any grand, overarching story that claims to explain everything, whether it be the Christian story of salvation or the scientific story of progress. This critique destabilises the old hierarchy that placed scientific rationality at the top, opening up space for other ways of knowing.
  • The Post-Secular Turn: Contrary to the predictions of 19th and 20th-century secularisation theories, religion has not disappeared from public life. Thinkers like Jürgen Habermas, once a staunch secularist, have argued that we now live in a "post-secular society." In this society, we must acknowledge the continued relevance of religion. Habermas argues that religious traditions can be valuable sources of moral insight for the wider society, but they have a "translational proviso": religious citizens must be able to translate their faith-based moral arguments into a universally accessible, secular language when participating in public political debate.
  • The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR): This emerging interdisciplinary field seeks to explain the prevalence of religious belief as a natural byproduct of our evolved cognitive architecture. For example, our tendency to over-detect agency in our environment (the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device, or HADD)—hearing a rustle in the grass and assuming it's a predator, not just the wind—may make us predisposed to believe in invisible agents like gods and spirits. The implications of CSR are hotly debated. Does a naturalistic explanation of religious belief debunk it (the genetic fallacy), or does it simply describe the mechanism through which a real God might make Himself known?

As a student, your role is not to resolve this epic dialogue but to understand its profound complexity. The relationship between religion and rationality is not a single, static opposition but a dynamic, multifaceted, and ongoing negotiation. It is shaped by history, contested by philosophers, analysed by social scientists, and lived out in the daily lives of billions. To grasp the nuances of this conversation—to see beyond the caricatures and into the deep structures of human thought—is to gain a powerful lens through which to understand our past, navigate our present, and contemplate our future in an increasingly complex world.


NOTE: Dear students, this is sufficient as of now, but the lecture will he enhanced by the end of this month. By the end of this month the shorter version of this lecture will be also available. 

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